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Abstract 
From a feminist political economy perspective, this article examines two recent 
trends in agricultural production in china likely to exacerbate gender inequalities that 
have been growing since the 1980s economic reforms. First, rural women are looking 
after land contracted to the family to grow food for the family while men are engaging in 
trade, marketing agricultural products and/or employment in cities. Second, some men 
have found opportunities, opened up by the government’s land transfer policy, to 
create agricultural farms by contracting land from other villagers. Women work for 
these farms as wage laborers.  These trends reinforce male-dominated systems of food 
provision and pose threats to “food security” in China’s countryside, meaning 
inadequate access to diverse, valued foods that promote good health. These threats are 
particularly acute as gender disparities in rural areas increase. I conclude that existing 
examples of agricultural workers' cooperatives are important prefigurative practices. 
Such cooperatives could serve as places where women cooperators’ voices are 
strengthened against patriarchal policies in the household and in communities. This has 
important implications for food security. 
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Rural women in China are often left alone working on their families’ contracted land. 
These women are known as “liushou funu”, “women staying behind on land”. The land they are 
working on is most likely their husbands’ families’ contracted land. At the same time, these 
women do the lion’s share of reproduction, while men have moved to urban areas for jobs. They 
bare the brunt of coping with the negative outfall of the daunting “three problems” in the 
countryside: slower growth of farmers’ income compared to rising costs of living and of social 
services; obsolete agricultural production that is no longer competitive at the world level; and 
underdeveloped rural areas given an overall urban biased economic orientation by the Chinese 
state (Chen 2008: 19).  
 In this article, I argue that these problems are particularly acute given strong gender 
differences in rural farming and rural incomes. These differences are rooted in a long history of 
gender inequalities in China. But these inequalities have been exacerbated by changes in the 
world political economy and fostered by Chinese state policies that fail to account for and give 
voice to rural women, who engage in vital productive and reproductive labour. This study uses 
official Chinese state information and academic analysis supported by quantitative survey data 
and my own more qualitatively based field research in four provinces: Guangdong and Fujian in 
the southeast coast and Hebei and Shandong in central China. I examine recent discussions of 
food security – meaning access to diverse, valued food contributing to healthy living – from a 
feminist political economy perspective to show how gender inequality in rural China exacerbates 
food insecurity. In so doing, I highlight the ways that Chinese rural development strategies 
neglect women’s role in agricultural production and food security. 
 This examination informs policy changes in the final discussion of a balanced approach to 
rural development. But it is not strictly a policy focus. Instead I am arguing for political changes 
to strengthen the voice of rural women, arguing that expanding agricultural cooperatives is one 
critical way of bringing about changes that improve women's wellbeing.  These rural 
cooperatives will enable women cooperators to have a stronger role within their households and 
more broadly in society, which is critical to fighting off risks to food security in their families, 
sharing more equitably in social welfare and generally speaking bringing about greater well-being 
for Chinese rural women and their families. 
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Male-Dominated Systems of Food Provision: Agricultural Policy since the Great Leap 
Forward 
 
 Chinese scholars (Zhang Xiaotao and Wang Yang 2009: 3-5) have suggested that food 
provision involves the organization of agricultural production and rural and urban industries 
that use agricultural products. But they observe that food provision also includes food processing 
industries and distribution mechanisms through commerce and international trade. In other 
words, they suggest that agricultural production and distribution form a basis for the Chinese 
economy; this economy is not only national but embedded in world-wide capitalist relations. The 
entry of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, for instance, is one way that 
China is formally integrated into global market economics. Yet this is capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics. While no longer a planned economy with near-total government control, China 
still retains strong state controls alongside corporatization and marketization measures adopted 
in the 1980s to improve productivity (Zhang Xiaotao and Wang Yang 2009: 9; Wang Guofeng 
2009: 45).  
 
The 1950s and 1960s: From an Agricultural to an Industrial Economy 
 
 For more than half a century, ever since the Great Leap Forward movement in the late 
1950s, government control in China has been driven by a strategy centered on industrialization 
and urbanization, processes that depend upon plundering agriculture and exploiting farmers. 
Initially, the government brought agriculture under control by establishing the state as the sole 
supplier and customer of agricultural production. The establishment of the systems of 
communes and the Agricultural Supply and Sales Cooperatives helped the government minimize 
the costs of agricultural production and distribution. At the same time, the government adopted 
a food rationing system and a household registration system to control the size of urban 
populations dependent on the government for food, rather than subsistence. These strategies 
maximized the grain supply for industrial uses and minimized human consumption of food.  
Farmers received small land holdings during the land reforms in the early 1950s. These 
farmers were organized into cooperatives mostly on a voluntary basis. In the three years leading 
up to the Great Leap Forward in 1958, they were encouraged to merge their cooperatives into far 
larger collectives, named People’s Communes. This collectivization movement made farmers 
members of the communes without rights to directly control the use of land and decide the use of 
harvests. Instead, control was exercised through a quota system set up by the government. The 
communes were incorporated as the lowest level of the state administration, making it easier for 
the government to control agricultural production and food distribution, as the number of 
producers was reduced from 0.15 billion small farm households to 50,000 amalgamated 
communes (Zhang Xiaotang and Wang Yang 2009: 64).  
  The government used the Agricultural Supply and Sales Cooperatives throughout the 
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country to provide productive materials, including fertilizers and seeds, and to monopolize the 
collection of grain quotas from each commune. In this way, the government established a 
“scissors’ pricing” system, namely, suppressing the prices of agricultural products and the costs of 
distribution so as to subsidize industrial production. As Deng Yiming et al (1993: 5, sited by 
Zhang Xiaotao and Wang Yang 2009: 71) reveal, from 1953 to 1962, this system enabled the 
government to collect an additional 120.86 million tons grain over and above what had collected 
nine years earlier, a 41 percent increase. This enabled China to transition from an economy 
centered on agriculture, representing 50.5 percent of the GDP in 1952, to an industrial economy 
with agriculture reduced to 32.8 percent of the GDP by 1976. China's first phase of 
industrialization was thus based largely on crude accumulation from agriculture. 
Further, the government regulated the size of the non-agricultural population in 
accordance with the needs of industrial production and the conditions of harvests. For instance, 
during the Cultural Revolution the state sent urban youth and government employees to the 
countryside. This created further burdens for farmers, who suddenly had to feed those sent to 
rural areas but on the same amount of land. The increased exploitation of farmers by the state 
did not give rise to open conflicts, however, partly because the communes, as farmers’ collectives, 
served as a buffer that obscured the government’s manipulation and control over agricultural 
production.  
 
The 1970s and 1980s: From Communes to the Ten Policies to Improve the Rural Economy 
 
The communes operated collectively, integrating production with social reproduction. 
They were guided by equalitarian principles, namely, equalizing income through a work point 
system, sharing the responsibilities of taxation, and developing mutual protection against the 
impacts of disasters among its members. There were collective funds to look after members’ 
health needs, the needs of the most disadvantaged, and to pay for children’s education. Women 
benefited from such collective welfare arrangements, achieving a higher level of both economic 
and political participation in the 1970s compared to earlier decades. Other benefits included 
improvements to population health, as many communicable diseases were eradicated due to 
rural cooperative healthcare programs (Chen and Standing 2007).  
In the 1980s economic reforms, however, a transition began in government control.  
The state initiated the household land contract responsibility system to reorganize agricultural 
production in response to rising food shortages and low productivity. This system re-distributed 
land use to households; by offering farmers an opportunity to improve household livelihood, the 
state hoped that farmers would have an incentive to increase agricultural production. By the early 
1980s, nearly all the communes were dissolved. Small-scale households once again became the 
unit of agricultural production. Productivity soon increased and harvests abounded across the 
country. However, this reform assigned women to a subordinate position, since it utilized the 
male head of household system to distribute resources, including land. It also failed (see Chen 
2008: 6-7) to allow for coordinated action to build social organizations, such as farmers’ 
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associations or cooperatives and village women’s groups, to address the gendered social impacts 
of this reform policy. Likewise, the reforms failed to include coordinated action to transform 
previous systems of food distribution. This greatly weakened the power of farmers and especially 
rural women. 
Problems that troubled policymakers in the early 1950s remained, not least of which was 
linking thousands of small-scale household producers with outlets for seeds and sales of their 
products. Consequently, in the 1980s, the government mobilized the old Agricultural Supply and 
Sales Cooperatives and enacted a system of contracts. These contracts were signed between 
commerce departments and farmers before planting, based on sales for a fixed amount of grain, 
30 percent of which was at a base negotiated price and 70 percent guaranteed at a higher price 
than the negotiated base price. Farmers could sell any surplus outside the contracted quota in 
local or more distant markets. As a result of such policies, farmers saw a 35 percent increase in 
the price they received for their grain products in 1984 compared to just a few years earlier, in 
1979 (Zhang Xiaotao and Wang Yang 2009: 81). Just prior to this, from 1978 to 1984, China had 
seen grain production increase by 23 percent, from 319 kg per capita in 1978 to 393 kg in 1984. 
This brought China, for the first time, close to the world average. Such increases challenged the 
system of government control, which was based on managing low levels of consumption and 
food shortages. 
Another major turning point came in 1985, when the State Council adopted the Ten 
Policies to Improve the Rural Economy (Zhang Xiaotao and Wang Yang 2009: 81-84). These ten 
policies brought an end to the previous unilateral system of government control. Under the “ten 
policies” farmers were invited to sign contracts directly with enterprises and government 
agencies. The so-called “dragon-head enterprises,” leading processing, trade and consumption of 
agricultural products, often had the financial and technical support of local government offices.  
This subcontracting of production to small household-based farmers created multiple links in the 
chain of agricultural production and distribution. These chains of production and distribution 
link from government organizations and enterprises with government ties, such as the 
Agricultural Supply and Sales Cooperatives and local branches of the China Grain and Oil Group 
Corporation, to specialized agricultural associations, and to individual farmers (Ou Zhiwen 2008: 
122). This new chain of agricultural production and distribution has been largely unfavourable to 
small farmers, who are in the main women and are in a weak bargaining position compared to 
the larger government organizations and enterprises. 
In 1987, Gao Xiaomeng and Xiang Ning (1992, cited by Zhang Xiaotao and Wang Yang 
2009) surveyed 93 counties and found that state-owned agricultural agencies were still the 
dominant force as together they controlled 55.78 percent of the total shares in the buying and 
selling of grain products outside of sales fixed at government-contracted prices. Zhang Xiaotao 
and Wang Yang (2009: 85) suggest that next to these national state-owned agricultural agencies 
were enterprises owned by local governments that use grain as their main raw material, with 
18.04 percent of the market. The Agricultural Supply and Sales Cooperatives relatively limited 
influence was restricted to 7.7 percent market share, ahead of individual trading enterprises. The 
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farmers, at the bottom, were organized into associations of specialized households and 
authorized to sign contracts with government controlled enterprises.  
 
The 1990s and 2000s: Who Shall Feed the Chinese? 
 
In the middle of the 1990s, the state responded to the “who shall feed the Chinese?” 
debate by promoting the modernization of agriculture through corporatization, while 
maintaining a government role in pricing and trade. The state promoted “dragon-head 
enterprises,” mentioned briefly earlier, facilitating contracts between such enterprises and 
individual farmers and farmers’ associations. Beginning in this period, different provinces set 
their own prices and policies for grain supply and storage, as the varying growth of population 
and rise in income demanded changes in the structure of food provision. The governor of each 
province was delegated responsibility for the regional structure of grain storage from cities to 
counties, deciding what percentage, anywhere from 18 to 30 percent, out of the province's annual 
output of grain would be stored. Within this provincial grain storage structure, farmers 
themselves were expected to be responsible for up to 70 percent of the grain storage. At the same 
time, in the year 2000, according Liu Qi (2012: 127-8), the government established the General 
Grain Storage Management Corporation, under the State Council. This grain storage was 
designed for military use and for emergencies.  
By 2007, agricultural production, though reduced in significance as a share of the 
economy, still contributed 11.3 percent of the GDP and occupied 40.8 percent of the total work 
force in China (China Statistical Yearbook 2008). Grain production remains an important part of 
the Chinese economy, especially in the large agricultural provinces in central China (Hebei, 
Henan, Shandong, Anhui, Jiangsu, Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan) and provinces in the northeast 
(Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia). Indeed, these provinces together have 65 percent 
of the arable land, produce over 70 percent of the total grain output and provide over 80 percent 
of the grain marketed for consumption (Wang Guofeng 2009: 107-108). Due to poor 
transportation in the northeastern and the western areas as well as the loss of arable land in the 
south and along the east coast to urban development, grain supply has been tight to the needy 
south and eastern coastal areas, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Hainan, 
Guangdong and Fujian, western areas of Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Guizhou, 
Yunnan, and Chongqing. Tibet is generally self-sufficient at subsistence levels, although there 
may be rare periods of emergency food shortages. Emergency shortages elsewhere are typically 
caused by poor state management of grain markets and, to a lesser extent, transportation 
bottlenecks (Wang Guofeng 2009: 110-111). 
 Indeed, despite the government efforts initiated under the “who feeds the Chinese?” 
debates in the 1990s, there is little indication that there are important grain stores across the 
country.  As Liu Qi (2012) notes from a news report by the official state paper Economic News 
Daily on June 14, 2011, one of the hundred highest grain production counties, Lanxi County in 
Heilongjiang Province in the northeast, had an annual grain output of over 1 billion kg. Yet 
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many of its grain stores are empty. Liu Qi also finds that many farmers, like those in Qide County 
in Anhui Province, have no capacity to store more than 300-400 kg a year, which is just enough 
for the family’s annual consumption. Many rural families with members moving into 
non-agricultural production have followed urban residents in storing 5 kg extra staple food per 
person in the family. But such low capacity of grain storage at the local levels threatens food 
security.  
 So far, I have drawn a picture of changing agricultural policy in China since the Great 
Leap Forward. After a period of collectivization that increased bargaining power and mutual 
support among rural farmers, especially in the 1970s, these communes were broken up into 
single households, specifying a male head of household, as part of broader economic reforms in 
the early 1980s. Subsequently, increasing corporatization and marketization has been pursued 
alongside a persistent and important role for local and national governments, that still control 
much of the sale and distribution of grain. Although grain production increased after the 
communes were disbanded, it then tapered off only to improve again slightly in recent years, 
China has not been able to guarantee adequate storage of grains especially for emergency 
household use. Moreover, individualized farming households are in a weak position on local, 
national and international markets, with respect to much larger local, national and increasingly 
international buyers. 
 All of this has taken place in an international context unfavourable to agricultural 
workers. For instance, when China joined the WTO in 2001 it agreed to drastically limit 
agricultural subsidies, creating new hardships for farmers just when prices for agricultural inputs, 
like fuel, were increasing, in part due to financial speculation on these inputs. All of this has 
created food insecurity for household farmers by damping production and because low income 
from farming means that farmers have limited cash to buy supplementary, high-quality food in 
times of need and pay for social services. But so far, I have only hinted at the gendered nature of 
these dynamics. Next, I turn my attention to what these transformations have meant for rural 
women. 
 
Rural Women: The Lower End of the Value Chain of Production 
 
 As indicated by a 2004 government report, 60.1 percent of employed women in China 
were in agriculture, 9.4 percentage points higher than men. 1999 government statistics show that 
these women agricultural workers invariably earned about 60 percent of what men made.1  This 
percentage went up as high as 68 percent in 2005 but then declined to 56 percent in 2010.2 
                                                 
1 From the White Paper on China’s Employment Conditions and Policies, published by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security of China in April 2004. 
2 See pages 60, 63, and 65 in the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007) and the 3rd National Survey on the 
Status of Chinese Women Report at http://www.wsic.ac.cn/academicnews/78621.htm, accessed on 9 August 2013. 
The decline of rural women’s income, compared to men’s, in recent years is one indication that inequality in the 
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Increased world competition forced Chinese agricultural producers to reduce costs and lower 
prices in the early 1990s, and then in the years since 2001 when China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization. Since women make up the bulk of agricultural workers, they have 
disproportionately suffered from lower agricultural prices. But more importantly, this inequality 
results from rural women’s increasingly unequal access to productive resources over the past 
decades and from unrelenting pressures on rural women in the sphere of social reproduction 
given persistent gendered divisions of labour.  
Land, for instance, is under significant pressure given the recent, unrestrained frenzy of 
government appropriation for mostly commercial development. This ‘land grab’ may be 
interpreted in classical historical materialist terms as state-supported primitive accumulation, in 
this case through the dispossession of subsistence farmers. It represents an outright assault on 
farmers’ rights to housing, dignity, and a decent standard of living. Although there is 
compensation, women are especially shortchanged largely because they tend to move in with 
their husbands’ families after marriage. In recent years, once village women are married to 
someone outside their villages, their home villages erase their memberships and entitlements (see 
Chen 2014). Moreover, seeds, whose production and distribution have been controlled by big 
companies that have links with governments, continue to limit farmers’ choices over decisions on 
production. Local governments’ policies to promote lead “dragon-head enterprises,” in rural 
restructuring further disadvantage small farmers including women. Practically, the combined 
results of such policies are to further gender disparities. Women are concentrated in labor 
intensive farming and raising animals in addition to their reproductive responsibilities in the 
household. In contrast, men dominate enterprises or operations in processing and sales, 
conferring both greater authority and better pay on men (Chen 2008: 33-34).  
Rural women’s position at the lower end of the value chain of production threatens food 
security. Given their relatively lower wages and income compared to men and given rising 
household costs, they frequently do not have sufficient resources to cover the costs of 
reproduction, including food, education and health care, and weather the impacts of economic 
slowdown on rural families and communities in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008/2009. 
Women and their families are vulnerable as well when recovering from natural disasters, which 
may be linked to climate change and other humanly created damage to the natural environment, 
like the widespread draughts first in the southern and then in the northern agricultural regions in 
2010/2011.  This is because women have little extra income against hard times and because they 
produce little surplus that can be saved for use against such natural disasters.  
How has this situation for women come about? As already described, many state 
agricultural policies focus on increasing agricultural productivity, and grain supply, distribution 
and storage. These represent a concern from the “top” for reversing the decline of grain output 
and the imbalanced regional provision of staple foods. This is very far from political change from 
                                                                                                                                                             
countryside is expanding as a result of the gender-based divisions of labour in agriculture.    
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“below”, initiated by and for women producers. Such change from below might instead focus on 
increasing household income, achieving more equality between men and women, including in 
the sphere of the household, and improving women's wellbeing.  Indeed, despite the existence – 
since 1949 – of the official All-China Women's Federation and constitutional guarantees of 
gender equality, rural women have little political voice. Consequently, in recent agricultural 
policy, there is no recognition of the role of women as producers and providers of household 
food security. Ironically, this neglect of women's roles actually damages the Chinese state's efforts 
to achieve higher productivity.  
Gendered divisions of labour, including in food provision and distribution, are not new 
to rural China. However, they are exacerbated by the government strategy concerning grain 
production and distribution in which reproduction is separated from production. This artificial 
separation is reinforced by a set of institutionalized rules, norms and values that govern the 
distribution of resources, responsibilities and power among social groups delineated by gender, 
class, ethnicity, and further shaped by internal migration. In this, the state occupies an 
overwhelmingly powerful position as it oversees the divisions of labor through its legislative, 
administrative and judicial arms. In favouring production at the expense of social reproduction, 
it adopts insensitive and even harmful policies to subordinate women and the disadvantaged, 
favouring production at the expense of social reproduction (Lanyan Chen 2011).   
For instance, since the 1990s, some rural households which specialize in specific products 
have formed shareholding associations. They are able to sign contracts with enterprises and 
government offices, breaking through the boundaries of small scale, household-based production. 
There was also a movement for rural women to organize into cooperatives, as I documented 
earlier (Chen, 1999), which had received support from local state-sanctioned Women’s 
Federations. However, the government’s neglect of cooperatives and its control of rural financial 
institutions, overall, discouraged women’s cooperatives and eventually led to their dissolution.  
Even if this was not the intention of the state policy, the consequence of the planned demise of 
these cooperatives has greatly weakened women's voices. 
In practice, state policies have institutionalized and favoured the male head of household 
in the distribution of resources and services in the countryside. By failing to explicitly recognize 
the role of women, given a gendered division of labour, the head of household system has helped 
establish men’s superiority in authority and wealth and enforced women’s subordination and 
their responsibilities for reproductive labour.  Furthermore, when men migrate from rural areas 
to the city for paid work without their wives, women are left as the de facto head of the 
household – responsible for work inside and outside the home. But despite this reality, women 
are still treated as subordinates and are given few institutional support when they try to exercise 
authority.  
  Among these responsibilities, women generally maintain household food security. 
According to the Food and Agricultural Organization, food security “exists when all people, at all 
times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2013: 16-7).  The 
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responsibilities to safeguard food security include the provision of daily food at the household 
level, and the distribution of food equitably among people, regardless of economic means to pay. 
The issue of distributing food equitably concerns vast geographic areas, but also includes 
equitable distribution at the most local levels, among members of households. This household 
distribution of healthy food, in adequate amounts and variety, is the centre of women’s concerns 
with family wellbeing. Yet if one of women's major tasks in china is securing food for the 
household, policymakers rarely recognize women’s indispensable roles in the provision of daily 
food at the household level and in the equitable distribution of food among members of 
households.  
  Recognizing women's indispensable roles requires a feminist political economic analysis 
to decipher not only the impacts of policies on women but also women’s potential to influence 
policies; such feminist analysis “makes visible” what is invisible in Chinese economic policies, 
including the vital relations between productive and reproductive labour and the gendered 
divisions of both forms of labour. What such feminist analysis shows is that the rural reform 
policy of household land contract responsibility, adopted at the start of the Chinese economic 
reforms in 1979, has failed rural women. It is true that recent policies to improve healthcare and 
pensions in the countryside may help relieve some burdens of care by women. For example, with 
respect to care for the sick and the elderly, women may experience some relief when care is 
provided by institutions like clinics and elderly home facilities. However, official state 
agricultural policies still largely ignore rural women’s work, and do not address women’s 
continued, overwhelming responsibility for housework and home-based care.  In fact, 
widespread cases of milk powder poisoning are suggestive of the ways that rural women have 
been overburdened, and that they are unable to ensure food safety in the face of combined 
interests in profit on the part of local governments and corporations; at the same time, these 
cases of milk powder poisoning put new pressures on women who must strive to ensure food 
safety despite their multiple roles in and outside of the home (see a report, for example, at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-executes-2-for-tainted-milk-powder-scandal-1.792477). 
 One direct measure of the enormous stress and lack of support for rural women in China 
is the elevated rates of suicide among these women. Indeed, suicide is the leading cause of death 
among rural women in China. In particular, rural women are unable to cope with rising debts 
given declining agricultural prices, rising production costs and the unrelenting pressures of 
women’s everyday household labour. The widespread availability of pesticides means that suicide 
is a readily-available option for too many women in rural China (see, for instance: 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/12/09-011209/en/#).  As the following case studies 
show, however, rural women’s situation is not identical across China and the variations are 
suggestive of ways that these women’s political voice may be strengthened. 
 
A Closer Look: Case Studies of Rural Women in Contemporary China 
 
In the countryside of Guangdong and Fujian provinces in the southeast of grain needy 
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areas, where land is scarce and is largely mountainous and rocky, and of Hebei and Shandong 
provinces in the central grain production areas, there are two gendered systems of agricultural 
production that continue to place rural women potentially at a disadvantaged position. These 
two trends reinforce gender inequalities, although women in the south, working in isolation, 
seem to face more challenges than their sisters in the central region, where the women work 
together and have opportunities to speak with a collective voice.  
Rural women in the two southeastern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, for instance, 
manage small family plots and occupy the lower end of the market chain by selling their 
agricultural products in local farmers’ markets or to wholesalers in local wholesale markets that 
have been set up mostly by men to meet the needs of distant markets. Men not only control local 
markets but also the supply chains between local markets and retailers including big agribusiness, 
both domestic and transnational, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour. In contrast, in Hebei and 
Shandong in the central region where it is flat, there are expanding agricultural farms run by men 
who have leased land from other farmers, or sometimes from women who have lost the ability to 
cope with the costs of farming their own lands while their husbands and children have left to 
work in urban areas. These women often work for the emerging larger farms on a seasonal basis, 
earning a daily wage. Women’s income is comparatively lower than men’s even though it is used 
more often for covering the costs of family’s reproduction and grain storage in preparation for 
emergencies and scarcity. These disparities are serious challenges not only to rural women but 
also to household food security.   
 
The Cai Household 
 
 In Fujian, for instance, Mr. Cai’s household is located in a village of the Hua Ting 
Township in the District of Cheng Xiang, Pu Tian area. The household has three members, 
including his wife and daughter who studies in high school. The family has only 1.3 mu of land (1 
mu is about 666.66 square meters). As land is very scarce the land per capita of this village is only 
0.39 mu. The land used by the family is still considered part of village property so it cannot be 
sold but it could be contracted out to other village members or even someone from outside the 
village. The land, though it is small, is still broken into smaller plots, some of which are fairly 
fertile as they are in the valley and others are dry as they are on the slopes of hills. The wife looks 
after the land, growing rice on some plots and vegetables, peanuts and fruit trees on others. The 
land is used all year around and so the wife has to work all year. She gets help from her daughter 
and husband, when he is at home, and during harvest. Her harvests are mostly for family 
consumption and she sells what is left, such as peanuts and fruits, to the local markets. She feeds 
the family everyday with the food she grows and makes herself. The government removed 
agricultural taxes but with the increased cost of fertilizer, she may be just be able to break even 
with her food production when she gets a good harvest. She also tries to cover the needs for cash 
through raising chickens and pigs and working as a day laborer.   
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Mr. Cai travels a lot with his business of buying and selling piba and lychee and he grows 
mushrooms in the winter. He entered in a partnership in 2001 with four friends, with each 
initially pooling 50,000 yuan. They share local information with respect to harvests and market 
prices, and together can better expand their client base with their local contacts among villagers. 
They buy lychee and piba from villagers and transport them to distant wholesale markets in 
Fujian and even further north to Zhejiang Province. They use local women villagers, like his wife, 
working for a daily wage of up to 100 yuan to quickly sort their fruit by quality and load them in 
baskets. This is done right near the fields while still fresh. They also go to Guangdong and 
Guangxi to buy lychee and piba from farms and package them right by the field with the use of 
local female labour and transport them back to Fujian taking advantage of the fact that the fruits 
ripen earlier in Guangdong and Guangxi than in Fujian. They also ship to Zhejiang Province 
where there are major fruit wholesale markets.  
In 2001 they invested in a refrigerated warehouse nearby the Zhejiang fruit markets to 
store fresh fruit for up to a month to wait for a better price. Mr. Cai explained that in 2001 piba 
and lychee started to come from Vietnam and Thailand into China at a much cheaper price after 
China became a member of the World Trade Organization. This drove down the local prices. 
Before 2001 piba was sold at a price of around 11 or 12 yuan a jin (one Chinese jin is half a kg). 
In 2008 at the time of my visit in early August, piba was already harvested in Guangdong and the 
best price he could get was 3 yuan a jin. He already lost 20,000 yuan earlier in June when he and 
his partners visited the same businesses in Guangdong, buying lychee, at 0.8 yuan a jin, and 
transporting to Zhejiang markets and selling at 3.6 or 4 yuan a jin. They did not get a high 
enough price to cover the costs of packaging and transportation. There was an oversupply of 
lychee as a result of competition from foreign imports and more people from Fujian and nearby 
provinces who were doing the same as they did. He did not expect much profit from sales of piba 
harvested in Fujian in August. Also, other types of fruits from far away places started to appear in 
the local markets, and consumers, even lovers of local fruits, had more choices. He was still 
working on schemes to earn money, including raising mushrooms when the fruit season was 
over, in order to finish building the house the family was living in. 
Mr. Cai’s household is representative of the other households in the area I visited. On the 
one hand, the overall story is one of increasing precariousness, as rural families try – and often 
do not succeed – in competing in selling produce on newly-open markets. But this is complicated 
by a gender-based division of labor that has developed in the household with the wife feeding the 
family but receiving less recognition as she contributes – at least in good times – less to the cash 
income needed for major expenses like their daughter’s higher education.  
 In the Cai family, the wife’s subordinate position was clearly indicated to me as she opted 
to stand nearby while I tried to involve her. She had no chance to address my questions since Mr. 
Cai always spoke as the head of the household. One influence clearly is the traditional 
gender-based division of labor, with the man in charge of (valued) production for a cash market 
and the woman responsible for (unpaid and un-valued) reproduction. Another influence is 
obviously the penetration of a cash-based economy where the husband as the main cash-earner is 
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more valued than the wife, whose work to keep crops growing and the family fed. Ironically, Mr. 
Cai is more prominent in the family even when his business ventures fail, as a consequence of 
declining prices for fruits in an increasingly international market. In such ways, more traditional 
and new patterns of economic life tend to foreground men’s labour and reinforce male 
domination within already-patriarchal households. This seems to be true even as men bring less 
cash into the household. 
 
The Liang Household 
 
Similar observations occurred at a village in Nantao Township, Nansan County, 
Zhanjiang City, Guangdong, which is situated on an island, with over 500 villagers in 70 
households. Lack of water means the village cannot grow rice. Growing sweet potatoes as the 
mainstay food is the wives’ work and raising pond shrimp for cash is the husbands’ job. The 
village chief, Mr. Liang, entered into a partnership with Mr. Li, in 2001, to raise pond shrimp in a 
seven mu area, while his wife grew sweet potatoes on a two mu plot which was mostly for family 
consumption as little profit could be made by selling them. Their three adult sons were working 
in Shenzhen City. Mr. Liang and his partner could earn up to 180,000 yuan a year. Shrimp were 
profitable because the Guolian Fisheries Development Corporation in Zhenjiang (Guo Lian 
Shuichan Kaifa Gufen Youxian Gongsi), sells its products to North America, Japan and Korea, as 
its website claims, and had a processing factory on the island and purchased shrimp from the 
local farms. When I visited in August 2008, similar to my previous experience, the wife kept quiet, 
while the husband explained, among other issues, that the household did not need to store grain 
as they could buy whenever it is needed outside their harvest of sweet potatoes. In other words, 
Mr. Laing “naturally” assumed his role as the household authority, implicitly claiming that his 
ability to bring cash into the household mattered more than the sweet potato production of his 
wife. His wife did not challenge his authority, at least in my presence, perhaps in part because she 
worked in isolation and was therefore without the support of colleagues outside of the household 
– which might have given her more courage and bargaining power within the household. 
  
An Alternative?: A Local Economy Based on Cooperatives and Collective Welfare  
 
In these two households in Fujian and Guangdong, the wives, who worked by themselves, 
did not have a voice on household issues. If they were to have a chance to work together as a 
cooperative, like the women I saw in a specialized organic vegetable shareholding cooperative in 
Cangzhou, Hebei, they might find it easier to voice their opinions, both in the work outside the 
home and within the household. Mr. Liu, a village official, leased 200 mu from other villagers to 
create this shareholding cooperative to meet the growing urban market demands for organic 
produce. The shareholding cooperative hired local villagers to work in three departments, 
growing, packaging, and serving in the cooperative’s restaurant. The women who worked in 
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administration and marketing had higher wages and a better education than those in these three 
departments. Out of the twenty workers growing vegetables, for example, fifteen were women 
working eight hours a day at a rate of 8 yuan an hour. These women had largely rented out their 
family contracted land and earned an income supplementing the family income, while their 
husbands worked in nearby cities. As I talked to them while they were working in the vegetable 
fields, the women villagers expressed their concern with rising food prices. These women’s voice 
of concerns for food prices would likely produce pressure which would be felt by village leaders 
including Mr. Liu, who was trying to use the shareholding cooperative to spin off more projects 
to contribute to the village’s collective coffer to pay for cooperatively based healthcare and 
pension for the villagers. 
The women in the Ri Sheng Cooperative in Lianjiang, Guangdong, are another example 
where they are visible and have a voice. The Ri Sheng Cooperative is an association of specialized 
households in the production and marketing of lychee and piba. It was founded in 2003, three 
years before the adoption of the Law on Farmers’ Specialized Cooperatives of the People’s 
Republic of China, with twenty households of lychee and piba growers, pooling 500,000 yuan 
together to find new ways collectively to market their products. It grew to include 302 
households spreading from Lianjiang into different cities including Suixi, Wuchuan, and Moning 
in Guangdong in 2008. Some of the households managed as many as 1000 mu for growing fruits. 
Most households had between 30 and 50 mu. In 2007, the cooperative had a total output of 7000 
tons of lychee and 1000 tons of piba. The cooperative had its own trademark – “Guang Liang,” 
granted by the government agency for its environmental friendly quality. Under this brand it not 
only supplied its fruits directly to Chinese supermarkets but also exported them to North 
America and other countries. The cooperative was able to secure export and domestic markets in 
such a short time, despite heightening competition, because when the cooperative office gets an 
order, it quickly sends out the information on the quality, amount, timing and locations of the 
order to its members and organizes transportation and packaging quickly to meet the order. The 
member households coordinated on questions of when to fertilize and water as well as in other 
technical aspects of production through an online platform operated by the cooperative with the 
support of the local telecommunication company. It used the electronic platform to disseminate 
management decisions, technical information with respects to pest control, weather broadcasting, 
marketing information and business plans. It hires local village women, who were not necessarily 
members, as day laborers at 100 yuan a day to sort and package fruits for each order. 
The cooperative works on a member assembly system where major decisions on fees for 
services and the use of profits are adopted based on one household, one vote. At the assemblies, 
both husbands and wives attend as the wives are the ones spending the most time in looking after 
the fruit trees and have the technical expertise and also need to receive any new technical 
information first hand. Though the director and two vice directors of the cooperative were men, 
there were several women working in the marketing and accounting departments at the time of 
my visit on August 5, 2008.  They spoke with authority on the conditions of markets as they saw 
them at the time, while the directors listened. In other words, because they worked in a 
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cooperative and had to be knowledgeable (about weather conditions, prices, production etc.) and 
share their knowledge (about their work), their role in agricultural production – which was 
invisible to patriarchal household heads in the cases of Mr. Cai and Mr. Laing – became visible. 
In fact, these women’s labour and knowledge about their work was visible in the whole 
cooperative. This gave them a voice and authority that many rural women in china do not have, 
in their workplace or in their homes. 
 
Conclusion: Giving Voice to Rural Women 
 
In China, the rural women who work on the land, with or without their husbands’ help, 
are disadvantaged in their access to resources. They are similarly disadvantaged in their 
participation in markets as they occupy the lower end of the value chain of agricultural 
production. In short, they are battling with inequalities in an increasingly cash-based market 
economy and struggling because they work in isolation and are not well organized. This lack of 
organized solidarity among rural women translates into limited bargaining power against 
male-dominated wholesalers and ultimately international agribusinesses and big retailers.  
Their isolation, as illuminated by the relative voicelessness of the women I interviewed in 
Fujian and Guangdong, reinforces women’s oppression in the family and the community.  This 
means that although women are responsible for reproductive labor, which is critical for family 
wellbeing and household food security, and for much of the productive labour, they have little 
authority. In recent decades, the corporatization and marketization of agriculture in China, 
which might have been done in more gender-equal ways, has instead furthered gender inequality 
and increased women’s oppression. Rural women are disenfranchised on issues relating to the 
production, distribution and storage of grain, the very issues that are at the center of current 
public discussions of food security. The consequence is a vicious circle: rural women’s voices 
have been ignored in political and policymaking discussions that vitally concern them, with the 
result that their lives have been made more difficult after reforms. At the same time, because they 
are now increasingly overburdened and under-valued as a result of the reforms, their political 
power is further reduced and they have greater difficulty in making their concerns heard. 
To change the course of policies –and more broadly of politics – around agricultural 
production that disadvantage rural women, mechanisms are required to advance their 
participation in economic and political processes on an equal footing with men. I strongly 
suggest the promotion of women’s cooperatives in order to help them gain a collective voice in 
influencing decisions on agricultural production, distribution and storage. When women 
collectively work together, they have opportunities to share experiences and ideas, so improving 
both economically and socially. Cooperatives thus represent an important way for rural women 
to turn their concerns into joint efforts to build collective welfare and to influence policies to be 
more sensitive to meeting their gendered needs. Such gendered needs include rural women’s 
demands for access to productive resources including land, credits, knowledge and organization 
of information and cooperation. They must also move up the value chain of agricultural 
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production and distribution to deal directly with players that influence markets, including 
wholesalers, national and transnational corporations.  
Some socialist feminist might object that I am just advocating for women to play a bigger 
role in an unjust and exploitative capitalist system. I would argue that these efforts matter in 
terms of improving rural women’s wellbeing in the immediate term, not least by helping women 
day laborers have a stronger collective voice that may enable them to guarantee basic food 
security. Moreover, there are broader political implications of rural women finding a collective 
voice through cooperatives. If they can gain some political weight by organizing cooperatively, 
they can begin to influence decision-making at the level of local planning of agricultural 
production and distribution.  
If cooperatives like the Ri Sheng Cooperative in Lianjiang, Guangdong, could persuade 
the local governments to accept cooperatives as a category of licensed businesses, they could also 
find ways to compete in markets. This is not just about “being competitive” – it is about better 
pay for rural women’s labour and agricultural production and it is intimately tied to these 
women’s welfare and the welfare of their families. Moreover, such cooperation might also allow 
women to develop ways to store grain collectively in support of food security. They would 
certainly be in a better collective position to create new pressures for socially equitable programs 
with respect to rural healthcare and pension. Collective wellbeing depends on a political voice for 
women; cooperatives are one way that rural women in China can begin to develop that critical 
voice. 
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